

OFFICIAL INFORMATIONCONFIDENTIAL**EVIDENCE CODE SECTION 1040
INTRADEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE**

DATE: June 18, 2020

TO: Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

FROM: Inspector General

SUBJECT: OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTING 035-19 FOR 6/23/20 CLOSED-
SESSION AGENDA

<u>Division</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Duty-On (X) Off ()</u>	<u>Uniform-Yes (X) No ()</u>
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77 th Street	7/26/19	9:45 p.m.		
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<u>Officer(s) Involved in Use of Force</u>	<u>Length of Service</u>
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Lockwood, K./PO III	10 years, 7 months
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Total Involved Officer(s)

1 x PO III

1 x PO II

<u>Suspect</u>	<u>Deceased ()</u>	<u>Wounded (X)</u>	<u>Non-Hit ()</u>
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Jarron Edmond: Male Black, 39 years of age.

COP Recommendations

Tactics – Administrative Disapproval, Officers Lockwood and Castanon.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Lockwood and Castanon.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Lockwood.

IG Recommendations

Tactics – Same as COP.

Drawing/Exhibiting – Same as COP.

Lethal Use of Force – Same as COP.

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INVESTIGATION

Annotated Force Investigation Division (FID) Incident Summary¹

Synopsis: On Friday, July 26, 2019, at approximately 2141 hours, 77th Street Patrol Division, Gang Enforcement Detail officers were in foot pursuit of a male Black, armed with a handgun. During the foot pursuit, the male turned toward the officers while holding the handgun resulting in an Officer-Involved Shooting (OIS).

Investigative Summary

On July 26, 2019, 77th Street Patrol Division uniformed Police Officer III Kurt Lockwood, Serial No. 38804, (driver) and Police Officer II Andrew Castanon, Serial No. 41832, (passenger) were assigned to the Gang Enforcement Detail, unit 12G32.² Both officers were equipped with Body Worn Video (BWV), driving shop No. 88062, a marked black and white, hybrid police vehicle.

Over a three-year period assigned to 77th Street Patrol, Officers Lockwood and Castanon were assigned as partners on numerous occasions. At the time of this incident, Officers Lockwood and Castanon were assigned to 77th Street GED for nine and three deployment periods respectively. Officers Lockwood and Castanon were specifically assigned as GED partners for the last three weeks and had discussions regarding contact and cover, foot pursuit tactics and the containment of armed suspects. During the officers' discussions regarding foot pursuits of armed suspects, they agreed they would follow the suspect to set up containment.

At approximately 2141 hours, Officers Lockwood and Castanon were conducting extra patrol in the area of Vermont Square Park located at 1256 West 47th Street Los Angeles, California (CA) 90037.

Note: According to Officer Lockwood, he was specifically assigned to monitor the Rollin' 40 Crips gang and Vermont Square Park which is a known Rollin' 40's gang location. On a regular basis, Officers Lockwood

¹ The Incident Summary presented here is reproduced from FID's report regarding this case, and is supplemented with annotations by the OIG. All OIG annotations are referenced as an "OIG Note." All other references and citations in the reproduced FID Incident Summary (e.g., Investigators' Notes or Addenda Items) are reproduced directly from FID's report. Unless otherwise stated, all information provided in OIG annotations is derived from FID's investigation of this incident.

² Officer Lockwood, 10 years, seven months, with the Department, 33 years of age, 6 feet, 1 inch tall, 195 pounds. Officer Castanon, four years, eight months, with the Department, 27 years of age, 5 feet, 11 inches tall, 165 pounds. Both officers were in a marked, hybrid Black and White, Ford Crown Victoria police vehicle, wearing ballistic vests and had Department-approved service weapons, handcuffs, canisters of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) and TASERS attached to their Sam Browne equipment belts. Officer Lockwood had his side-handle baton and Hobble Restraint Device (HRD) in the police vehicle. Officer Castanon carried his HRD in his right sap pocket and his side-handle baton in the police vehicle.

and Castanon would drive by the park to see if there was any gang activity.

When the officers arrived at Vermont Square Park, Officer Lockwood observed 80 to 100 people gathered. The officers believed a group this large was unusual and decided to get out of their police vehicle. According to Officer Lockwood, their intention was to walk through the park and conduct consensual encounters, to see if anyone in the group drew their attention.

OIG Note No. 1: *Officer Lockwood told FID, "It's not unusual for twenty to thirty, I would say, older or ex-gang members to be hanging out drinking."³ He went on to state, "And I observed approximately, I would estimate 80 to 100 people congregating there. This was unusual."⁴*

OIG Note No. 2: *Officer Castanon stated, "As we got in view of the park, we observed, you know, from a hundred to possibly 200 people inside the park."⁵*

Note: Officers Lockwood and Castanon have encountered similar situations several times in the past. It has been their practice to walk toward a particular group to see if anyone appeared to be, *"trying to evade contact, get away, or we see a weapon."*⁶ Officers would communicate their observations to each other, and then coordinate the response of additional units to contain the individual.

Upon entering the park, the officers observed people drinking alcohol and smelled the odor of marijuana.⁷ According to Officer Lockwood's BWV, at 2141:30 hours, approximately 40 seconds after they exited their vehicle, Officer Lockwood used his hand-held police radio and notified Communications Division (CD) that his unit was Code-6 at 47th Street and Budlong Avenue.⁸ Officer Lockwood also requested two additional units to respond for a 415 group.⁹

OIG Note No. 3: *According to Officer Lockwood's BWV, prior to making the broadcast he and Officer Castanon had already walked through the*

³ Officer Lockwood's first statement, Page 8, Lines 14-15.

⁴ Officer Lockwood's first statement, Page 9, Lines 1-3.

⁵ Officer Castanon's first statement, Page 9, Lines 17-20.

⁶ Officer Lockwood's statement, Page 14, Lines 14-15.

⁷ Consuming alcohol in a public park a violation of 25620 Business and Professions code.

⁸ Code-6 denotes a unit is at scene.

⁹ 415 group denotes the California Penal Code 415 defined as a disturbance of the peace.

*crowded park to the opposite side from which they had entered, where they contacted two subjects they had seen walking away from the group.*¹⁰

As the officers walked through the park in a southwesterly direction, Officer Lockwood observed two males exiting the park onto Budlong Avenue, in what Officer Lockwood believed to be an attempt to evade contact. Officer Lockwood stated, *"Having worked gangs and dealt with many people who tried to get away from us, it drew my suspicion that maybe there was something up. My partner and I then ran to catch up to get a line of sight to see if they were in fact trying to get away from us, or if they were just people that were leaving the park."*¹¹

According to Officer Lockwood, as he and his partner exited the park onto Budlong Avenue, he illuminated the two males with his flashlight. One of the males, later identified as the suspect, Jarron Edmond, looked in the officers' direction and appeared to be startled by their presence.¹² Edmond slipped and fell as he attempted to flee while holding an *"unknown heavy object"* in his pants pocket.¹³ Officer Lockwood observed Edmond, *"grab at his right front pocket, grabbing onto what appeared to be an unknown heavy object in the front pocket. Based on the area and everything I saw, I believed he was attempting to gain access to a firearm."*¹⁴ *"Having dealt with many people that were armed gangsters that tried to get away, they'll typically try to get the gun and just kind of get out of sight and throw the gun, get rid of the gun. Based on my observations, the group, the park, my experience and knowledge of that park and that gang, I believed this guy was armed with a firearm."*¹⁵

Edmond held onto the object in his pants pocket, regained his footing and ran into a multi-family apartment complex located at 4723 South Budlong Avenue. According to Officer Lockwood, he was in a *"containment mode"* as he ran behind Edmond and tried to maintain sight of him.¹⁶ Officer Lockwood wanted to ensure Edmond did not run into one of the apartments or flee through the rear of the complex.

According to Officer Castanon's BWV, at 2141:56 hours, Officer Castanon used his hand-held police radio and broadcast a request for a back-up for a 415 man with a gun at 47 and Budlong.

¹⁰ Officer Lockwood's BWV, 04:41:26Z.

¹¹ Officer Lockwood's statement, Page 11, Lines 14-19.

¹² Jarron Phillip Edmond, Male, Black, 39 years of age, 6 feet tall, 185 pounds.

¹³ Officer Lockwood's statement, Page 20, Line 8.

¹⁴ Officer Lockwood's statement, Page 20, Lines 7-9.

¹⁵ Officer Lockwood's statement, Page 11, Lines 4-10.

¹⁶ Officer Lockwood's statement, Page 32, Line 3.

Note: Officer Castanon stated he believed he broadcast his unit was in foot pursuit of a 415 man with a gun. Officer Castanon did so, *“Based off my training and experience and my reasonable suspicion that this person was armed with a gun, based off his suspect’s actions, him observing us, fleeing the group of a hundred to two hundred gang members - - of potential gang members in the in the group.”*¹⁷ *“When he has his hands close to his waistband makes me believe that he has - - he’s armed with something.”*¹⁸

Officer Lockwood stated he believed Edmond was armed and the situation could lead to the use of deadly force when he unholstered his privately purchased, Department-approved 9-millimeter Smith and Wesson semi-automatic handgun. Officer Lockwood described holding his handgun at an approximate 45-degree angle with his index finger along the frame, in a *“modified low-ready”* and held his Department issued, Pelican flashlight in his left hand, as he ran behind Edmond.¹⁹

OIG Note No. 4: Officer Lockwood was asked by FID, *“And how are you - - how are you carrying your - - your handgun at that time?”* Officer Lockwood responded, *“I have it gripped in my right hand with my finger along the side of the frame, and my arm is, I wouldn’t say extended all the way out, but it - - it’s extended in an outward direction in front of me facing towards the suspect.”*²⁰ Officer Lockwood was then asked by FID if he considered that position to be a low-ready, or if he was up on target, where the threat was. He then replied, *“I would say it was kind of a modified low-ready. It’s not quite a low-ready as traditional on the range, but it’s not also directly up on target. So I place it maybe at like a 45-degree angle downward.”*²¹

According to Officer Lockwood’s BWV, at 2141:58 hours, while running behind Edmond, Officer Lockwood yelled, *“Let me see your fucking hands, right now.”* and *“Get on the ground or I’m going to shoot you.”*

Note: Officer Lockwood stated he made these statements toward Edmond in an attempt to *“overwhelm him, and warn him that he would be shot, and that this would gain compliance.”*²² Officer Lockwood used what he

¹⁷ Officer Castanon’s statement, Page 42, Lines 15-20.

¹⁸ Officer Castanon’s statement, Page 42, Line 25 thru Page 43 Lines 1-2.

¹⁹ Officer Lockwood’s statement, Page 22, Line 7.

²⁰ Officer Lockwood’s first statement, Page 21, Line 23 through Page 22, Line 2.

²¹ Officer Lockwood’s first statement, Page 22, Lines 6-12.

²² Officer Lockwood’s statement, Page 11, Lines 20-21.

referred to as “*tactical language*” in an attempt to de-escalate the situation and express to Edmond the seriousness of what was occurring.²³

According to Officer Lockwood, as they ran after Edmond through the apartment complex, he momentarily lost sight of him. Officer Lockwood continued to run in the direction he last saw Edmond and as he came upon a courtyard area, to the rear of 4723 Budlong Avenue, he re-acquired sight of him. Officer Lockwood found himself to be five to seven feet away from Edmond when he observed Edmond turning toward him, in a clockwise direction. As Edmond turned, Officer Lockwood observed a “*black handgun*” in Edmond’s left hand.²⁴

OIG Note No. 5: *With regard to losing sight of Edmond, Officer Lockwood stated, “As the suspect starts to run there, he even runs just at about a 45-degree angle right in a northwest direction from that little pathway. It was a very brief second that it appeared like he was out of sight. As I came into that little area, I observed him turning, waving his body to the right, basically turning back towards me.”*²⁵

OIG Note No. 6: *The OIG conducted an analysis of Officer Lockwood’s BWV footage. The series of frames that are time marked at 2019-7-27 T04:42:01Z show the suspect running in the narrow walkway, away from Officer Lockwood as he gave chase. The series of frames time marked at 2019-7-27 T04:42:02Z show the suspect running and turning right into the courtyard area. After Officer Lockwood turns into the courtyard area, the OIS occurs as the frames time marked at 2019-7-27 T04:42:02Z transition into the frames time marked at 2019-7-27 T04:42:03Z. Although Officer Lockwood stated that the suspect was out of sight for a “very brief second,” the suspect was in the view of Officer Lockwood’s BWV throughout that time.*²⁶

Officer Lockwood feared Edmond was turning to shoot him. According to Officer Lockwood’s BWV, at 2142:02 hours, he fired four times at Edmond while continuously illuminating him with the flashlight in his left hand.

Note: During Officer Lockwood’s interview with FID investigators, he indicated that he believed he fired three times.²⁷

²³ Officer Lockwood’s statement, Page 40, Line 22.

²⁴ Officer Lockwood’s statement, Page 12, Lines 8-9.

²⁵ Officer Lockwood’s first statement, Page 12, Lines 2-7.

²⁶ Officer Lockwood’s BWV, 04:42:01Z - 04:42:03Z.

²⁷ Officer Lockwood’s statement, Page 12, Lines 9-10.

According to Officer Lockwood, the incident unfolded rapidly, and he was unable to use the sights on his handgun to acquire a sight picture. Officer Lockwood stated he was “point shooting,” which he explained as attempting to point his firearm in the direction of the suspect and get a close proximity hit.²⁸ Officer Lockwood stated he was aiming for Edmond’s torso area.

As Officer Lockwood fired at Edmond, he continuously assessed whether his rounds were effective. Officer Lockwood explained that he was looking to see if Edmond continued turning toward him or if he dropped the firearm. During the OIS, Officer Lockwood was aware that his background was a tall stucco wall.

Officer Lockwood knew his rounds were effective and he stopped firing when Edmond dropped the handgun and he fell to the ground.

According to Officer Lockwood’s BWV, at 2142:04 hours, as Edmond was falling, an object that appears to be a handgun is shown lying on the ground where Edmond previously stood.



Edmond initially fell into a supine position and immediately put both of his hands up in an outward direction. Edmond can be heard stating, “I don’t have nothing man.” Officer Lockwood instructed Officer Castanon to “Put it out,” before he told Edmond, “Do not reach.”

²⁸ Officer Lockwood’s statement, Page 25, Lines 20-22.

Simultaneous to Officer Lockwood giving Edmond commands, at 2142:04 hours, 26 seconds after initially going Code-6, Officer Castanon broadcasted to CD, *"George 27 shots fired, officer needs help, 47 and Budlong."*

Note: Officer Castanon inadvertently identified their unit designation as George 27 when the unit they were assigned was George 32.

According to Officer Lockwood's BWV, at 2142:13 hours, he ordered Edmond to roll over onto his stomach and advised Officer Castanon, *"The gun is behind him."* Edmond then stated, *"I don't fucking have no gun, that wasn't me."*

According to Officer Castanon's BWV, as he approached Edmond for handcuffing, a black handgun was visible on the ground, within 1 to 2 feet from Edmond's upper torso.

According to Officer Lockwood's BWV, at 21:42:30 hours, Officer Castanon handcuffed Edmond as Officer Lockwood used his hand-held radio to notify CD the suspect was in custody. Thirty-five seconds after the OIS, as Officer Lockwood was completing a notification to CD, a male black, later identified as Gary Collins, appeared to have climbed over a chain-link fence that stood between the park, where the large group was gathered, to where the OIS occurred. Officer Lockwood's BWV depicts Collins approaching, as Officer Lockwood broadcasted a request for immediate back-up for a 415 group, *"In the yellow apartments just west of Budlong"*.²⁹

Officer Castanon stated to FID investigators, during the incident he remained holstered until he observed Collins approach. Officer Castanon unholstered his Department-approved .45 caliber Colt semi-automatic handgun and held it at the low-ready. Officer Castanon repeatedly told Collins to get back and to not come any closer. Officer Castanon stated he unholstered, *"Due to the fact that we already had one person armed with a firearm. We know it's a large gang group. We know that gang members have firearms. We know that they're - - they're in - - we've had - - from my training and experience, we've had large groups, multiple gang members armed with firearms to protect themselves from enemy gangs, from shootings when they're out in the open. I didn't know if this guy was armed with a firearm, this individual that climbed the fence. I don't know what his intentions were to hurt myself or my partner. And due to the fact that he may be armed with a firearm, and the situation could arise to that point where deadly force would be necessary, I drew my firearm. When I realized that he was there just to videotape us and ask us questions, I re-holstered my firearm and gave him commands."*³⁰

According to Officer Castanon's BWV, at 2145:23 hours, Collins was detained by the responding officers.

²⁹ Gleaned from Officer Lockwood's BWV.

³⁰ Officer Castanon's statement, Page 23, Line 11 thru Page 24, Line 2.

Note: On July 26, 2019, Force Investigation Division (FID) Investigators interviewed Collins. Collins stated he was looking through an opening in a fence, when he observed Edmond turn toward the officers with his hands up. The officers then shot Edmond three times. Collins stated he never observed the actual shooting, but he heard the gunfire. Collins stated he did not observe Edmond in possession of a handgun. Collins also stated he filmed the incident using his cellular telephone. However, when Collins was detained, his cellular telephone was confiscated. When officers returned the cellular telephone to Collins, he discovered the video had been deleted.³¹

On July 30, 2019, Collins advised an FID investigator that he may not have recorded any video related to the OIS.³² Later that same day, Police Service Specialist I, Steven Ching, Technical Investigation Division, examined Collins' cellular telephone and determined video from the OIS was never recorded on Collins' phone.

A complaint was generated and forwarded to Professional Standards Bureau for investigation (Complaint Form No. 19-002218).

According to Officer Castanon's BWV, at 2143:21 hours, approximately one minute and 14 seconds after the OIS, Officer Castanon requested a rescue ambulance (RA) for "*a male black, approximately 30 years of age, conscious and breathing, multiple gunshot wounds.*"

According to the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), Prehospital Care Report Summary, at 21:46:17 hours, the LAFD received the alarm to respond to 4721 South Budlong Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90037.

The following uniformed personnel responded to the officer's emergency and secured the scene: 77th Street, Gang Enforcement Detail, Officer II Marco Peralta, Serial No. 41169, and Matthew Clark, Serial No. 41636, Sergeant I Alvaro Navarro, Serial No. 35321, Metropolitan Division, Police Officer III Bradley Nielson, Serial No. 36445, and John Walker, Serial No. 38023, along with additional officers from Metropolitan Division, 77th Street Division, Southwest Division and Southeast Division. Officers cordoned off the crime scene and formed a skirmish line to disperse a large crowd that was yelling obscenities at the officers.

³¹ Collins was interviewed by FID investigators Detective II Guillermo Medina, Serial No. 35905, and Sergeant II Lisa Ruvalcaba, Serial NO. 35777, Senior Investigator Sonia Florez and Deputy District Attorney Deann Rivard from the Los Angeles County District Attorney's office, Justice System Integrity Division.

³² Collins provided his signed consent, granting permission to have his cellular telephone examined.

Officer Nielson has a background in tactical medical treatment and provided Edmond with first aid.³³ Officer Nielson stated to FID investigators, while accessing Edmond's injuries, he observed a gunshot wound to Edmond's right side and a through and through gunshot wound to his right hand. Officer Nielson applied a chest seal and attempted to make Edmond comfortable until the RA arrived at scene.

According to Sergeant Navarro's BWV, upon arrival, he separated Officers Lockwood and Castanon and obtained a Public Safety Statement from Officer Lockwood.

According to the LAFD, Prehospital Care Report Summary, at 2156:22 hours, LAFD personnel arrived at scene. Firefighter/Paramedics Sharleen and Ornelas provided emergency medical treatment to Edmond for a gunshot wound to the right flank and the right hand. Edmond was transported to California Hospital Medical Center, located at 1401 South Grand Avenue. Officer Peralta accompanied Edmond in the RA with his BWV activated. According to Officer Peralta's BWV, Edmond did not make any statements regarding the OIS while en route to the hospital.

Note: Los Angeles Fire Department personnel were not interviewed due to the presence of Officer Peralta's the BWV.

At approximately 2201 hours, Department Operations Center (DOC) was notified by 77th Street Patrol Division, Sergeant I Ali Kaspian, Serial No. 34871, of the Categorical Use of Force of the Categorical Use of Force.

At 2208:27 hours, LAFD RA 246 arrived at California Hospital Medical Center with Edmond. Edmond was assigned patient number 10366944 and placed under the care of Doctor Charles Guidry for two gunshot wounds. Doctor Guidry admitted Edmond to the hospital for his injuries.

Jarron Edmond was later absentee booked at Metropolitan Detention Center for Ex-con with a firearm.³⁴

At 2320 hours, FID, Detective II John Macchiarella, Serial No. 35095, was the first FID representative at scene.

Force Investigation Division received the Assessment of Supervisor's Response to a Categorical Use of Force on December 16, 2019.


Detective Macchiarella reviewed all documents and circumstances surrounding the separation, monitoring and the admonition to officers not to discuss the incident prior to being interviewed by FID investigators.

³³ Officer Nielson received a certification from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center after attending the Tactical Medical and Tactical Medical Instructor course. It is Officer Nielson's practice to carry a trauma kit issued to him during the medical training.

³⁴ Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person a violation of 29800(A)1 of the California Penal Code.

OIG Note No. 7: FID informed the OIG that its review of the separation, monitoring, and admonition to the officers involved in the OIS did not reveal any issues of concern.

Scene Description



The OIS occurred to the rear of 4723 Budlong Avenue which was a multi-family apartment complex. There was a 3-foot-wide cement walkway shared by the residents of 4723 and 4725 Budlong Avenue. The cement walkway led to a grassy courtyard area that was located in front of 4721 Budlong Avenue, which was where the OIS occurred.

The OIS occurred during hours of darkness, at approximately 2142 hours. There was a single flood light that hung between 4723 and 4725 Budlong Avenue that provided artificial lighting of the area where the OIS occurred. The environmental conditions were dry and clear skies.

Canvass for Witnesses


On July 27, 2019, uniformed officers at scene directed FID personnel to Witness Gary Collins. Collins claimed to have witnessed the OIS. Force Investigation Division personnel also canvassed the 4700 block of Budlong Avenue and located witness Sheila Calvin. Gary Collins and Sheila Calvin's transcribed statements are contained in this report.

An additional canvass was conducted by FID personnel on August 6, 2019. Two witnesses were identified who heard the gunfire only. Copies of their heard only witness forms are contained in the FID casebook.

According to Witness Sheila Calvin, on July 26, 2019, at approximately 2145 hours, she was inside of her residence at 4723 South Budlong Avenue, apartment number four, when she heard two gunshots. Calvin immediately looked out a bedroom window (that faces Vermont Square Park) when she observed people scattering everywhere. Calvin ran to another window that faces her backyard and observed two officers standing over *"a guy lying on the ground and he was bleeding."*³⁵ Calvin heard the male on the ground say that he couldn't breathe. Calvin observed the officers turn the male onto his side and it appeared as though they were looking to see where he was injured. Approximately ten minutes later *"the Fire Department came or ambulance, and they put him on a gurney and they took him out."*³⁶

Calvin stated that she did not observe the male on the ground in possession of a weapon or any additional witnesses in her backyard.

Suspect Information



Jarron Phillip Edmond, a male Black with brown hair and brown eyes. At the time of the incident he was six feet tall, 185 pounds and had a date of birth of October 19, 1979. Edmond was identified by CII No. A10967702.

Edmond did not have any prior Los Angeles Police Department, Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU) contact.

Edmond's criminal history consisted of three felony convictions for possession of a controlled substance for sales (2007 and 2010) and the transportation to sell a controlled substance (2010). At the time of the OIS, Edmond was not a documented gang member and he was not on parole or probation.

On July 30, 2019, FID, Criminal Apprehension Team, Detective II Francisco Alvelais, Serial No. 30865, presented a criminal complaint to Los Angeles County Deputy District

³⁵ Witness Sheila Calvin's statement, Page 3, Lines 15-16.

³⁶ Witness Sheila Calvin's statement, Page 3, Lines 23-24.

Attorney Cathy Choy, who filed one count of Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person and Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited from Possessing a Firearm against Edmond.³⁷

Injuries

Gunshot Wound No. 1 – The bullet entered the right mid back. The trajectory of the projectile went through the posterior abdominal wall and lodged in the vertebra.

Gunshot Wound No. 2 – The bullet travelled through Edmond's right hand.

Note: The pathway of the gunshot wound to Edmond's right hand was not determined.

Evidence

At approximately 0315 hours, Forensic Services Division (FSD), Firearm Analysis Unit (FAU), Chief Forensic Chemist I Vanessa Gould, Serial No. 4427, Criminalist II Annette Woivode, Serial No. N4427, Criminalist II Kristen Rocco, Serial No. N4670, and Criminalist I Alyssia Lilio, Serial No. N5906, responded to 4723 Budlong Avenue and conducted an examination of the OIS scene for ballistic impacts, trajectories and projectiles. As a result of their examination, numerous items of evidence were recovered. Included in those items were; a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, Item 9, five .38 caliber cartridges of live ammunition, Item 10, four discharged 9-millimeter cartridge casing, Items 11 through 14, and a fired bullet, Item 15

On July 27, 2019, at approximately 1130 hours, FID, Criminal Apprehension Team Detective II Jose Chavez, Serial No. 27375, conducted a follow-up to California Hospital Medical Center where he completed a Gunshot Residue (GSR) kit on both of Edmond's hands. On January 2, 2020, FSD, Criminalist II Vanderschaaf, Serial No. N4220, completed the analysis of the kit and concluded that gunshot residue was detected on both swabs collected on Edmond.

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³⁷ Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person, a violation of section 29800(A)(1) of the California Penal Code and Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited from Possessing a firearm a violation of section 30305 (a)(1) of the California Penal Code.

Weapons



Jarron Edmond was armed with a blue-steel .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, model 042, Serial No. BKP0808. The handgun was loaded with five live cartridges of .38 caliber ammunition, Items 9 and 10. The handgun had a barrel length of 1 ¼ inches.

Edmond's handgun was found lying on the north/south concrete pathway in front of 4721 Budlong Avenue with the muzzle pointing in a southeasterly direction.

The handgun was previously reported stolen during a residential burglary out of Southwest Area, in September 2009, Division of Record number 0903-24611.

Officer Lockwood was armed with his Department authorized 9-millimeter, Smith & Wesson Military and Police 9L semiautomatic handgun. The handgun was carried in a Ted Blocker holster, equipped with a single thumb strap. According to Officer Lockwood, at the time of the OIS, the handgun was loaded to capacity with 18 rounds of Speer Luger 9-millimeter 147 grain ammunition. Seventeen rounds were in the magazine and one round was in the chamber of the handgun.

On July 27, 2019, at approximately 0250 hours, FID Detective II John Macchiarella conducted a post-incident examination of Officer Lockwood's handgun. He determined the firearm was loaded with one round in the chamber and 13 rounds in the magazine, consistent with Officer Lockwood firing four rounds. Detective Macchiarella also inspected the two additional magazines Officer Lockwood wore on his utility belt. Both magazines were loaded to capacity with 17 rounds of Department-approved ammunition. The four expended 9-millimeter cartridge cases collected at the OIS scene were also determined to be Department-approved.

On October 16, 2019, FAU, Firearms Expert Srinivasan Rathinam, Serial No. N3851, completed a report documenting the test firing of Officer Lockwood's handgun. The handgun was found to be functional and the trigger pull value was within the Department's established range.

Detective Macchiarella verified that on March 20, 2014, Officer Lockwood's 9-millimeter Smith and Wesson handgun was entered onto his Firearm Inventory Tracking System.

Firearms Analysis

Criminalist Woiwode identified two impacts, with two corresponding bullet pathways. Pathway A was consistent with a projectile traveling in a southeast to northwesterly direction. Pathway A terminated in a stucco wall located at 4721 South Budlong

Avenue. The second pathway was observed on the recovered cellphone booked as Item 16, consistent with a front to back directionality.

On September 9, 2019, Forensic Print Specialist III Edgar Berrios, Serial No. N1917, examined Edmond's handgun and ammunition for fingerprint evidence. No latent prints were developed.

On October 17, 2019, Criminalist Woiwode examined and test fired Edmond's handgun. Criminalist Woiwode determined that Edmond's handgun functioned as designed. The capacity of the handgun's cylinder when fully loaded, is five rounds of ammunition.

Criminalist Woiwode swabbed Edmond's handgun and ammunition for Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) collection. On November 19, 2019, Criminalist II Kari Mar, Serial No. N4622, concluded that due to the limited amount of data in the profile taken from Edmond's handgun and ammunition, the DNA results were unsuitable for interpretation.

Visual Documentation

Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS): Officers Lockwood and Castanon's police vehicle, Shop No. 88062 was equipped with a DICVS. However, the officers parked their vehicle at scene prior to the OIS and the DICVS was not activated. Fifty-three of the responding units had their DICVS activated. Because all of the units responded after the OIS occurred, none of the DICVS footage captured the OIS.

Body Worn Video (BWV): Officers Lockwood and Castanon activated their BWV prior to making contact with Edmond and recorded the entire incident. One hundred fifty-one officers responded to the scene and activated their BWV as required per Department policy. None of the responding officers' BWV captured footage of the OIS.

Social Media: Personnel assigned to the FID Cyber Unit monitored social media sites from the date of the incident until the submission of this investigation. No additional video footage was discovered.

Photographs: Photographs of the OIS scene and associated evidence were stored under TID control No. 0770015 and 0770017. Copies of the photographs were also retained in the FID investigative case file.

Notifications

At approximately 2201 hours, the DOC was notified by 77th Street Patrol Division, Sergeant I Ali Kaspian, Serial No. 34871, of the Categorical Use of Force. At 2206 hours, The DOC notified FID, Officer in Charge, Lieutenant II Brian Reynolds, Serial No. 36054. Force Investigation Division received the Assessment of Supervisor's Response to a Categorical Use of Force on December 16, 2019.

Personnel at Scene

Force Investigation Division, Detective John Macchiarella, arrived at scene at approximately 2320 hours. A complete list of personnel who responded to the scene is contained within the investigative case file.

Communications

A copy of the Communications Division printout and master recording for Incident No. 190726006260, 77th Street Area base frequency captured the radio transmissions related to this incident. A copy of the CD audio recording is contained within the FID case file.

Justice System Integrity Division

This case met the criteria for presentation to the Justice System Integrity Division (JSID) and will be presented after completion of the Board of Police Commission.

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CHIEF OF POLICE REPORT³⁸

Chief of Police Findings

Tactics – Administrative Disapproval, Officers Lockwood and Castanon.

Drawing/Exhibiting – In Policy, No Further Action, Officers Lockwood and Castanon.

Lethal Use of Force – In Policy, No Further Action, Officer Lockwood.

Chief of Police Analysis

Detention

- The involved officers observed a large group gathered during the evening at a park previously known for gang activity. The officers made the determination to conduct consensual encounters while on foot with individuals in the park. Officer Lockwood requested additional units for the large group and observed two individuals, one of who was Edmond, who he believed were attempting to avoid the officers and evade contact. Officers quickly followed after the individuals and located them a short distance away at which time the officers observed Edmond lose his footing, grab a heavy object in the area of his right front pants pocket, and have his hands near his waistline. Both officers independently formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun and pursued Edmond on foot through a multi-unit apartment complex as they ordered him to show his hands and get on the ground. Edmond did not comply and continued to flee on foot. The officers were in close proximity to Edmond when he turned towards the officers in a clockwise motion with a black handgun in his left hand, resulting in an OIS. The officers' actions were appropriate and within Department policies and procedures.

Tactics

- Department policy relative to a Tactical Debrief is: *"The collective review of an incident to identify those areas where actions and decisions were effective and those areas where actions and decisions could have been improved. The intent of a Tactical Debrief is to enhance future performance."*

Department policy relative to Administrative Disapproval is: *"A finding, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that the tactics employed during a CUOF incident unjustifiably and substantially deviated from approved Department tactical training" (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 792.05).*

The evaluation of tactics requires that consideration be given to the fact that officers are forced to make split-second decisions under very stressful and dynamic

³⁸ The information provided in this section summarizes the analysis and findings set forth in the Chief of Police's report for this case.

circumstances. Tactics are conceptual and intended to be flexible and incident specific, which requires that each incident be looked at objectively and the tactics be evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances.

Tactical De-Escalation

- *Tactical de-escalation involves the use of techniques to reduce the intensity of an encounter with a suspect and enable an officer to have additional options to gain voluntary compliance or mitigate the need to use a higher level of force while maintaining control of the situation.*

Tactical De-Escalation Techniques

- **Planning**
- **Assessment**
- **Time**
- **Redeployment and/or Containment**
- **Other Resources**
- **Lines of Communication**

(Los Angeles Police Department, Use of Force - Tactics Directive No. 16, Tactical De-Escalation Techniques, October 2016)

Tactical de-escalation does not require that an officer compromise his or her safety or increase the risk of physical harm to the public. De-escalation techniques should only be used when it is safe and prudent to do so.

Planning – Officers Lockwood and Castanon had worked together various times in the past and had addressed general tactics including contact and cover, foot pursuit tactics and the containment of armed suspects. During the officers' discussions regarding foot pursuits of armed suspects, they agreed to follow the suspect and set up containment. During previous situations in which they encountered groups of individuals at various locations, Officer Lockwood stated he and Officer Castanon would walk toward the group to see if anyone appeared to be trying to avoid or evade contact with them. The officers would focus on those individuals and determine if they were armed or were involved in illegal activity. The officers' plan included communicating their observations to each other and then requesting resources to contain and apprehend those individuals. Officers Lockwood and Castanon did not formulate a specific plan for this incident and did not consider utilizing available additional resources in order to conduct a more tactically sound investigation. Based on Officers Lockwood and Castanon's knowledge of gang activity at the location the Chief would have preferred they establish surveillance of the group. The Chief would have preferred that Officers Lockwood and Castanon not base their enforcement action on the mere fact that an individual avoids contact or runs from them as this could result in officers engaging in foot pursuit without reasonable suspicion, or reasonable resources.

In this incident, Officers Lockwood and Castanon observed Edmond lose his balance and grasp a heavy object in the area of his right front pants pocket and have his hands near his waistline. The officers independently formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun and initiated foot pursuit of him. Officers Lockwood and Castanon pursued Edmond through a multi-unit apartment complex with minimal distance between them and Edmond in order to maintain a visual of Edmond, to prevent him from entering nearby apartments and prevent his escape. This incident would have benefitted with the coordination and pre-planning of Officers Lockwood and Castanon with other available additional resources.

Assessment – Officers Lockwood and Castanon assessed the situation as they observed a large group of individuals that were gathered at Vermont Square Park after the park was closed to the public. The officers elected to place themselves on foot patrol to gain further information and requested two additional units to respond to the location due to the size of the crowd.

Officer Lockwood observed Edmond begin to leave the park and believed he was attempting to evade contact. The officers followed behind Edmond to determine if he was armed with a weapon or if any criminal activity was occurring. Officers Lockwood and Castanon observed Edmond lose his balance and grasp a heavy object in the area of his front right pants pocket.

The officers' assessment led them to believe Edmond was armed with a handgun and Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol as he proceeded to pursue Edmond on foot.

Officer Lockwood observed Edmond turn toward him with a black handgun, assessed the deadly threat and fired four rounds from his service pistol at Edmond. Officer Lockwood assessed as he fired the four rounds and considered if Edmond still presented an imminent threat after each round fired. Officer Lockwood continued to assess after the OIS and advised Officer Castanon that Edmond's handgun had fallen on the ground next him. Officer Lockwood assessed the tactical situation immediately after the OIS and directed Officer Castanon to handcuff and take Edmond into custody as he was in close proximity to the officers and was lying unsecured next to a handgun. Additionally, Officer Castanon assessed the situation immediately following the OIS and broadcast an officer needs help call as well as requested an RA for Edmond's injuries.

Time – After observing Edmond lose his balance and grasp a heavy object in the area of his right front pants pocket, Officers Lockwood and Castanon immediately pursued Edmond and ordered him to get down on the ground and put his hands up. As they continued to pursue him through a multi-unit apartment complex, Officer Lockwood observed Edmond, suddenly and without warning, begin to turn in a clockwise direction toward him while holding a black handgun in his left hand. Officer Lockwood stated he fired his service pistol to protect himself and Officer Castanon from the deadly threat Edmond presented. Edmond's actions and

escalation of the encounter did not afford the officers additional time to respond to his deadly actions and significantly limited their tactical options.

Redeployment and/or Containment – Upon locating Edmond and observing him lose his balance and grasp a heavy object in the area of his right front pants pocket, Officers Lockwood and Castanon formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun. Officers Lockwood and Castanon initiated a foot pursuit and pursued Edmond through a multi-unit apartment complex. As Edmond entered the courtyard area of the complex, he abruptly stopped and began to turn in a clockwise direction toward the officers while holding a black handgun in this left hand. Due to the rapid manner in which Edmond turned toward Officers Lockwood and Castanon while armed with a handgun, and the minimal distance between the officers and Edmond, the officers had an extremely limited time in which to react to the deadly threat presented by Edmond. The rapid and dynamic nature of the foot pursuit, coupled with Edmond's actions, in which he unexpectedly turned toward Officers Lockwood and Castanon while armed with a handgun, did not allow distance or time for Officers Lockwood and Castanon to redeploy.

While in foot pursuit of Edmond, Officers Lockwood and Castanon's actions and proximity to Edmond indicated they were attempting to apprehend him and were not in containment mode. The Chief would have preferred that once Officers Lockwood and Castanon formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a firearm they should have discontinued their foot pursuit, gone into containment mode and establish a perimeter in an effort to contain him.

Other Resources – When Officers Lockwood and Castanon initially observed the large group of individuals gathered in Vermont Square Park, they requested two additional units due to the size of the group. Officers Lockwood and Castanon initiated a foot pursuit of Edmond prior to forming the opinion he was armed with a handgun, Officer Castanon requested additional resources to their location when he broadcast a backup request for a man with a gun. Officer Castanon further broadcast an officer needs help call for an OIS and once again requested additional resources to respond for officers confronting a large crowd which had become agitated. Additionally, Officer Castanon requested an RA to respond immediately after the OIS for Edmond's injuries.

Lines of Communication – Officers Lockwood and Castanon initially did not establish clear lines of communication with each other. Officers Lockwood and Castanon relied upon non-verbal cues and minimal verbal communication after they exited their police vehicle. Officer Lockwood directed Officer Castanon's attention to an unidentified individual by briefly pointing and stating, "Hey, tank top right here," just prior to initiating a consensual encounter with the individual as he was attempting to leave the park. Officers Lockwood and Castanon maintained limited lines of communication as Officer Castanon was alerted by Officer Lockwood's non-verbal cue when he began to run after Edmond.

However once their focus shifted to the apprehension of Edmond, Officers Lockwood and Castanon utilized open lines of communication. Officers Lockwood and Castanon utilized clear direct commands when ordering Edmond to show his hands and get down on the ground as they pursued him. Officer Castanon continued to maintain open lines of communication with Communications Division (CD) when he requested a back-up for a man with a gun. Immediately following the OIS, Officer Lockwood maintained communication with Edmond by directing him to turn over onto his stomach. Officer Castanon once again continued to communicate and update responding units by broadcasting a “shots fired, officer needs help” call, as well as requesting an RA for Edmond’s injuries. Officers Lockwood and Castanon continued to speak to Edmond as Officer Nielson provided medical aid, in an attempt to keep Edmond conscious and assess his injuries.

The UOFRB noted, and the Chief concurred, that due to the rapid and dynamic nature of this incident, the involved officers had limited time to react to the deadly actions of Edmond. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond grasp a heavy object in his right front pants pocket while Officer Castanon observed Edmond’s hands near his waistline area. Both officers formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun. Officers Lockwood and Castanon immediately attempted to detain Edmond based on their belief that he was armed with a handgun and posed an immediate danger to the community. Officers Lockwood and Castanon attempted to de-escalate the encounter by giving clear commands directing Edmond to show his hands and get on the ground. The commands were given in an attempt to gain compliance and allow additional time to calmly resolve the incident. However, Edmond did not comply and abruptly turned toward Officers Lockwood and Castanon, armed with a black handgun in his left hand. Edmond’s deadly actions, in close proximity to the officers, extremely limited the time and options the officers had, and forced them to react to the imminent deadly threat presented toward them. Officers were required to make decisions that balanced the safety of the community and their own welfare while presented with an imminent deadly threat.

Debriefing Points

- During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:
- **Tactical Planning/Communication** (Substantial Deviation – Officers Lockwood and Castanon)

Officers must approach every contact, whether a consensual encounter or a lawful detention, with officer safety in mind. Complacency, overconfidence, poor planning, or inappropriate positioning can leave officers vulnerable to attack (California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Learning Domain 21).

In order to ensure officer safety and help ensure an appropriate outcome, the primary officers and cover officers must effectively communicate with one another. Appropriate communication involves:

- *Advising the primary officer of any critical occurrences or safety issues (e.g., movement within the target vehicle, someone approaching outside the primary officer's field of vision, possible crossfire situations, etc.),*
- *Avoid inappropriate interruptions, and*
- *Avoid giving directions which conflict with those given by the primary officer. Only one person, usually the primary officer, gives the commands, unless a specific situation calls for another officer to issue a command (California Commission on Peace Officers Standards and Training, Learning Domain No. 22).*

Officers Lockwood and Castanon failed to develop and communicate a clear tactical plan for the large group of individuals they encountered during the evening at a known gang location.

Operational success is based on the ability of officers to effectively communicate during critical incidents. Officers, when faced with a tactical incident, improve their overall safety by their recognition of an unsafe situation and by working together collectively to ensure a successful resolution. A sound tactical plan should be implemented to ensure minimal exposure to the officers, while keeping in mind officer safety concerns.

In this incident, Officer Lockwood stated he and Officer Castanon intended to follow a strategy they had used in the past by conducting consensual encounters with members of the group while assessing to see if any individuals attempted to evade them. The officers would then ascertain if the individuals attempting to avoid contact were armed or involved in any illegal activity. The officers intended to communicate their observations and direct additional resources to assist with containment and apprehension. According to Officer Lockwood, he observed Edmond attempting to evade contact, however he did not communicate his observation to Officer Castanon, but instead immediately ran after Edmond in order to ascertain if Edmond was armed with a weapon or involved in any illegal activity. The UOFRB majority was critical of Officers Lockwood and Castanon's failure to develop a clear tactical plan, which indicated complacency and a lack of consideration for the unusual size of the group, the specific time of night, and the availability of additional resources.

The UOFRB majority considered that Officer Lockwood is an experienced gang enforcement officer with specific knowledge of the park as well as the Rolling 40's Crips gang, who are known to congregate in the park. The UOFRB majority noted that after observing an unusually large group of individuals gathered at the park during the evening, Officers Lockwood and Castanon had sufficient time to communicate and formulate a focused plan, considering the group was not aggressive nor agitated at the time. The UOFRB majority opined that this lack of communication and planning, which did not take into account the size of the group of individuals, the time of night, as well as the available resources, put the officers at a distinct tactical disadvantage. Officers Lockwood and Castanon did not completely

develop or communicate a clear tactical plan between each other or with the inclusion of additional officers.

The UOFRB majority noted that the officers had an unclear plan, and the encounter would have benefitted from a more focused approach with additional planning utilizing all available resources focused on a specific objective.

The UOFRB minority reviewed the same set of facts and opined that Officers Lockwood and Castanon could have taken more time to plan prior to entering the park, but their actions were not a substantial deviation, based on information they had at the time, their observations of the large group of individuals, and the actions taken prior to initiating enforcement. The UOFRB minority noted the officers attempted to communicate with Edmond, as well as update additional resources of the ongoing tactical situation considering the rapid pace in which the incident unfolded.

The Chief would have preferred a more objectively based plan which included more thorough planning, such as having additional resources nearby and out of visual contact. Officers Lockwood and Castanon utilized a poor strategy they had employed in the past, based on the unusually large group of individuals that had congregated in the park at that particular time of night. The Chief would prefer that Officers Lockwood and Castanon not run after individuals who simply evade contact with police but instead establish an observation post and conduct surveillance of individuals they suspect are in possession of weapons or involved in other criminal activity. Once a crime has been established officers should then coordinate with additional resources to contain the suspect and take appropriate enforcement action to ensure the safety of officers and the public. The Chief would have also preferred that Officer Lockwood communicate his observations of Edmond to Officer Castanon prior to taking any action as the officers had planned in prior discussions regarding tactics. Additionally, the incident may have also benefitted from the request for an air unit to respond to the location. This would have allowed for the coordination of additional resources.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB majority determined, and the Chief concurred that Officers Lockwood and Castanon's lack of tactical planning and communication was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. The Chief directed that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

- **Code Six** (Substantial Deviation – Officers Lockwood and Castanon)

When a unit is conducting a field investigation and no assistance is anticipated, a "Code Six," followed by the location, shall be broadcast. A unit shall not go "Code Six" until it arrives at the scene of a call.

Units on "Code Six" status shall remain available for reassignment to priority calls by monitoring their radio frequencies. A unit on "Code Six" status may indicate to the dispatcher additional circumstances which will make the unit unavailable for assignment to a priority call. These circumstances may include:

- Suspect in custody;*
- Primary unit at a crime scene; and/or,*
- Required at a backup, assistance, or help location.*

Note: The unit shall notify the dispatcher as soon as it is again available for radio calls (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 120.40).

The purpose of broadcasting a Code Six location is to advise CD and officers in the area of the officers' location and the nature of the field investigation, should the incident escalate and necessitate the response of additional personnel. Vehicle and pedestrian stops can be dangerous, as the identity and actions of a person stopped is often unknown, and as in this case, their actions can be unpredictable.

Officers Lockwood and Castanon did not advise CD of their location expeditiously, waited until approximately 40 seconds after they exited their vehicle, and had already entered a significant distance into the park from Budlong Avenue.

The UOFRB majority noted Officer Lockwood is an experienced gang enforcement officer with extensive knowledge of Vermont Square Park, which is a known Rolling 40's Crips gang location. The UOFRB majority was critical of Officers Lockwood and Castanon's action of not broadcasting their Code Six location until approximately 40 seconds after they had parked and exited their police vehicle which the UOFRB majority opined compromised the officers' safety and placed them in a tactically disadvantageous position. The officer's plan was to conduct consensual encounters with individuals inside the park, but their actions contradicted this plan when they approached and questioned individuals and shined their hand-held flashlights at them all prior to going Code Six.

The UOFRB majority noted that Officers Lockwood and Castanon had sufficient time to broadcast their Code Six location, as well as any other relevant information, prior to making contact with any of the individuals in the park. The large group in the park did not appear aggressive or hostile and the officers were not confronted immediately with circumstances or serious criminal activity which would have prevented them from broadcasting their Code Six location. Additionally, Officers Lockwood and Castanon contacted unidentified individuals after entering the park and prior to broadcasting their Code Six location.

The UOFRB minority reviewed the same set of facts and opined that although the officers did not immediately broadcast their Code Six location, it was reasonable and not a substantial deviation, due to the need for the officers to determine what was occurring at the location and obtain the relevant information needed to be broadcast to CD.

Considering Officers Lockwood and Castanon immediately identified an unusually large group of individuals who had congregated at the park during the evening, the Chief would have preferred that the officers broadcast they were Code Six immediately upon exiting their police vehicle. Field investigations may escalate unexpectedly and may require the response of additional resources, as it did in this incident. Therefore, it is essential that officers provide their location and the nature of their investigation in order to keep surrounding resources informed should such a situation arise.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB majority determined, and the Chief concurred, that Officers Lockwood and Castanon's failure to broadcast their Code Six location in an expedient manner when provided sufficient time to do so, was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. The Chief directed that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

- **Apprehension vs. Containment Mode/Pursuing Possibly Armed Suspect**
(Substantial Deviation – Officers Lockwood and Castanon)

Apprehension versus Containment: *There are two pursuit modes officers may use when a suspect flees on foot, apprehension mode or containment mode. Some factors that will influence an officer's decision to operate in the apprehension or containment mode are the suspect's actions, officer's experience, training, physical fitness level, location and available resources.*

During apprehension mode, officers work as a team, pursue and attempt to overtake a fleeing suspect until apprehending the suspect, making the decision to discontinue the foot pursuit or transition into containment mode. The pursuing officers should assess and communicate with each other before deciding on a course of action.

Officers may make the decision to discontinue a foot pursuit when the tactical situation deteriorates, either officer becomes injured, or effective communication ability is lost (lost or broken radio or dead spot) or at either officers' discretion. If either of the pursuing officers feels it necessary to end the pursuit, he/she must alert the partner officer quickly to avoid separation.

If the suspect is no longer in sight or enters a structure such as a house, apartment or business, or gains a tactical advantage, officers may make the decision to continue the pursuit in containment mode while coordinating the response of additional units to establish a perimeter. Containing a suspect in a specific area can decrease the opportunity for an ambush and will make it more likely that the suspect will be taken into custody.

When the decision is made to establish a perimeter, officers should act quickly to prevent the suspect's escape and broadcast the following:

- *General location of an incident command post (the end of pursuit location). This location can be moved later.*
- *Boundaries for the perimeter. Remember it is easier to decrease a perimeter than increase one. Initially, even general locations or instructions will suffice. (e.g. 2 blocks to South and North, 2 blocks to East and West of my location).*
- *Request for air unit to assist in establishing or adjusting the perimeter. The presence of the air unit will also encourage the suspect(s) to remain within the perimeter.*
- *Request a supervisor and the necessary resources to safely handle the incident (Los Angeles Police Department Use of Force-Tactics Directive No. 3.2, Foot Pursuit Concepts, October 2013).*

Pursuing Armed Suspects: *When pursuing a suspect believed to be armed, officers should generally do so in containment mode while considering the available tactical advantages, including cover and concealment where available. The goal is to maintain observation of the suspect and the tactical advantage while coordinating the response of additional units and other resources for a perimeter with the objective of containing the suspect and taking him into custody safely. The decision to pursue an armed suspect in apprehension mode may be appropriate when the suspect is at a tactical disadvantage and an arrest can be accomplished with limited risk to officers or innocent parties.*

Officers Lockwood and Castanon engaged in a foot pursuit of an armed suspect in apprehension mode, rather than pursuing him in containment mode. Containment of an armed suspect demands optimal situational awareness. The ability to maintain the tactical advantage rests on the ability of the officers to effectively communicate, thus ensuring a coordinated effort and successful resolution. Generally, officers are discouraged from pursuing armed suspects on foot. Nonetheless, officers must be afforded a level of discretion regarding the appropriateness of their decision to engage in foot pursuit of an armed suspect.

The UOFRB noted Officers Lockwood and Castanon were in close proximity to Edmond as they pursued Edmond through a multi-unit apartment complex and the length of the foot pursuit was very brief. The UOFRB majority opined that after initiating their foot pursuit of Edmond, Officers Lockwood and Castanon maintained an unsafe distance while pursuing Edmond through a narrow walkway and placed themselves in a tactically disadvantageous position. The UOFRB majority noted that Officer Lockwood was five to seven feet from Edmond when Edmond turned towards him armed with a handgun and an OIS occurred.

The UOFRB minority reviewed the same set of facts and noted that the incident was fluid and only lasted approximately six to eight seconds from the time Officers Lockwood and Castanon began pursuing the suspect after forming the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun. The UOFRB minority considered that officers' ability to keep visual of a suspect prior to containment is imperative during any foot pursuit. The UOFRB minority opined that due to the brevity of the foot pursuit, the

officers' ability to transition to containment mode was negated and their actions were not a substantial deviation.

In this case, the Chief would have preferred Officers Lockwood and Castanon maintain a position of cover and stay in containment mode while they broadcast Edmond's actions, direction of travel and establish a perimeter as they planned to do when they discussed tactics prior to this encounter.

Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB majority determined, and the Chief concurred, that Officers Lockwood and Castanon's decision to pursue an armed suspect, in apprehension mode, was a substantial deviation, without justification, from approved Department tactical training. The Chief directed this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Additional Tactical Debrief Topics

- **Required Equipment** – The investigation revealed that Officers Lockwood and Castanon left their side-handle batons in their police vehicle. Additionally, Officer Lockwood also left his Hobble Restraint Device (HRD) inside of his police vehicle. Officers Lockwood and Castanon are reminded of the importance of having their required field equipment on their person to allow for additional use of force options during an incident. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.
- **Foot Pursuit Broadcast** – The investigation revealed that when the situation quickly escalated from a consensual encounter to a detention and foot pursuit, Officer Castanon was faced with a rapidly evolving scenario and was required to process multiple tasks. Officer Castanon did realize his role and requested a, "Backup for a 415 man with a gun," at 47th Street and Budlong Avenue. However, he did not include that he and Officer Lockwood were also in foot pursuit of Edmond and nor did he provide an updated location. Additionally, Officer Castanon did not broadcast Edmond's description or Edmond's direction of travel. Officer Castanon is reminded of the importance of providing the location of the officers and other relevant information to ensure that responding units are able to respond in a tactically safe and effective manner. When feasible, this is best accomplished prior to taking police action. The Chief directed that this be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.
- **Non-Conflicting Simultaneous Commands** – The investigation revealed that while they were engaged in foot pursuit of Edmond, Officers Lockwood and Castanon gave simultaneous commands to Edmond for him to show his hands and get on the ground. Although the commands were non-conflicting, the officers are reminded that simultaneous commands can sometimes lead to confusion and non-compliance. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

- **Running with Service Pistol Drawn** – While pursuing Edmond and subsequently entering the common area of an apartment complex Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol. Officer Lockwood continued to run after Edmond with his service pistol drawn and a short time later was involved in an OIS. Officer Lockwood is reminded that there is a heightened concern for an unintentional discharge when running with a service pistol drawn. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.
- **Single Handed Shooting** – The investigation revealed that Officer Lockwood utilized a one-handed shooting grip on his service pistol at the time of the OIS. Although the Los Angeles Police Department teaches a one-handed shooting technique, a two-handed shooting grip utilizing either a Harries or Chapman flashlight technique would be more tactically advantageous and provide a more stable shooting platform. Officer Lockwood is reminded to utilize a two-handed shooting grip whenever feasible. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.
- **Situational Awareness (Broadcast wrong unit designation)** – The investigation revealed that Officer Castanon broadcast the incorrect unit designation when he broadcast the help call. Although he provided the correct unit designation during a subsequent broadcast when he requested an RA for Edmond, Officer Castanon is reminded of the importance of accurately broadcasting all pertinent information when requesting help. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.
- **Updating Status** – The investigation revealed that Officers Lockwood and Castanon did not update their status from 47th Street and Budlong Avenue to 4721 South Budlong Avenue until after the officers had pursued Edmond into the multi-unit apartment complex and the OIS had already occurred. The officers are reminded of the importance of updating their status to ensure that CD is aware of their location should the incident necessitate the response of additional personnel. The Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.
- **Blood borne Pathogens** – The investigation revealed Officer Castanon did not don protective gloves prior to handcuffing Edmond who was bleeding from multiple gunshot wounds including one on his right hand. In an effort to enhance future performance and employee wellness, the Chief directed this to be a topic of discussion during the Tactical Debrief.

Command and Control

- *Command and Control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Command uses active leadership to establish order, provide stability and structure, set objectives and create conditions under which the function of control can be achieved with minimal risk. Control implements the plan of action while continuously*

assessing the situation, making necessary adjustments, managing resources, managing the scope of the incident (containment), and evaluating whether existing Department protocols apply to the incident.

Command and Control is a process where designated personnel use active leadership to command others while using available resources to accomplish tasks and minimize risk. Active leadership provides clear, concise, and unambiguous communication to develop and implement a plan, direct personnel and manage resources. The senior officer or any person on scene who has gained sufficient situational awareness shall initiate Command and Control and develop a plan of action. Command and Control will provide direction, help manage resources, and make it possible to achieve the desired outcome. Early considerations of PATROL will assist with the Command and Control process (Los Angeles Police Department, Training Bulletin, Volume XLVII Issue 4, July 2018).

Line Supervision – Defined. A supervisor who has the specific responsibility of issuing directions and orders to designated subordinates shall be considered as having the duty of line supervisor and shall be held accountable for achieving conformance with the directions and orders that he/she issues (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 3, Section 135).

Incident Commander (IC) – In accordance with Department Policy, the IC sets the objectives, the strategy and directs the tactical response. Directing the tactical response means applying tactics appropriate to the strategy, assigning the right resources and monitoring performance (Supervisor's Field Operations Guide, Volume 2, LAPD Emergency Operations Guide).

The investigation revealed Sergeant Navarro was the first supervisor to arrive to the OIS location to the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue. Upon his arrival at scene, he observed a skirmish line that was formed to contain a large crowd in Vermont Square Park. Sergeant Navarro believed the scene was contained at the time and responded to the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue where he located the involved officers. Sergeant Navarro immediately determined an OIS had occurred and separated both Officers Lockwood and Castanon. Sergeant Navarro directed Officer Lockwood to turn off his BWV, took custody of the BWV, obtained a Public Safety Statement (PSS), and monitored him. Additionally, Sergeant Navarro admonished Officer Lockwood not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Navarro believed he broadcast and declared himself the IC and directed personnel to secure the crime scene and continued to coordinate resources.

The investigation revealed Sergeant Adkins was the second supervisor to arrive at the OIS location to the rear of 4721 South Budlong Avenue where he located Sergeant Navarro along with Officers Lockwood and Castanon. Sergeant Navarro had already separated Officers Lockwood and Castanon and was in the process of obtaining a PSS from Officer Lockwood. Sergeant Adkins monitored Officer Castanon, verified his BWV was deactivated, took custody of his BWV, and obtained

a PSS. Additionally, Sergeant Adkins admonished Officer Castanon not to discuss the incident. Sergeant Adkins directed an additional GED unit to accompany Edmond to the hospital and assisted with securing the crime scene. Sergeant Adkins continued to monitor Officer Castanon until he was released to FID.

The UOFRB noted that all supervisors responded to scene after the OIS had occurred and the tactical situation had concluded. The UOFRB noted all sergeants met the requirements of supervisors after a Categorical Use of Force incident. As is expected, the sergeants adhered to their roles as supervisors and completed their assigned tasks. The sergeants ensured post Categorical protocols were adhered to by admonishing, separating, and monitoring their assigned officer until they were relieved.

The actions of Sergeants Navarro and Adkins were consistent with Department supervisory training and the Chief's expectations of field supervisors during a critical incident.

Tactical Debrief

- In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB majority determined, and the Chief concurred that Officers Lockwood and Castanon's actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department policy and training, thus requiring a finding of Administrative Disapproval.

Each tactical incident also merits a comprehensive debriefing. In this case, there were identified areas where improvement could be made. A Tactical Debrief is the appropriate forum for the involved personnel to discuss individual actions that took place during this incident.

Therefore, the Chief directed that Officers Lockwood and Castanon attend a Tactical Debrief and that the specific identified topics be discussed.

Note: Additionally, the Tactical Debrief shall also include the following mandatory discussion points:

- Use of Force Policy;
- Equipment Required/Maintained;
- Tactical Planning;
- Radio and Tactical Communication (including Code Six);
- Tactical De-Escalation;
- Command and Control; and,
- Lethal Force.

General Training Update (GTU)

- On August 1, 2019, Officers Lockwood and Castanon attended a GTU. All mandatory topics were covered including the Force Option Simulator and Foot Pursuits.

Drawing/Exhibiting

- Department policy relative to drawing and exhibiting a firearm is: *“An officer’s decision to draw or exhibit a firearm should be based on the tactical situation and the officer’s reasonable belief there is a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified”* (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No. 1, Section 556.80)
- According to Officer Lockwood, based on Edmond’s actions to avoid contact, his attempt to flee, as well as Edmond grabbing onto a heavy object in his pants pocket, Officer Lockwood believed Edmond was in possession of a handgun and attempting to gain access to the weapon to arm himself. Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol with his right hand to a modified low-ready, while holding his flashlight in his left hand as he pursued Edmond through a narrow pathway, based on his belief that the tactical situation could lead to the use of deadly force.

Officer Lockwood recalled, *“As I continued to follow him, I could see that we had a narrow pathway which didn’t provide a lot of cover. Believing that this guy was possibly armed with a firearm, I drew out my weapon.”*³⁹

*So I unholstered because I believed that this guy was armed with a firearm, and that this tactical situation could lead to the use of deadly force.”*⁴⁰

- According to Officer Castanon, immediately after he handcuffed Edmond, his attention was drawn to Collins. Officer Castanon did not know what Collins’ intentions were when Collins climbed the fence, considering it was immediately after Officers Castanon and Lockwood had chased Edmond from a gang related gathering, and had been involved in an OIS. Based on his training and experience, Officer Castanon believed Collins may be armed with a firearm and an associate gang member attempting to assist Edmond. Officer Castanon drew his service pistol to a low-ready as he gave Collins commands to stay back based on Collins’ actions of climbing a fence adjacent to the OIS location immediately following the OIS. Additionally, Officer Castanon believed the situation could arise to that point where deadly force would be necessary.

³⁹ Officer Lockwood, Page 11, lines 14-17.

⁴⁰ Officer Lockwood, Page 21, lines 2-5.

Officer Castanon recalled, "So, which directed my attention towards that individual who I believed climbed the fence. I made contact with that individual. Didn't know who he was. Didn't know why he was hopping the fence to come - - I gave him commands to - - to stay back. I drew my firearm at a low-ready position in that general direction where the individual was standing. And I gave him commands to stand back."⁴¹

*Due to the fact that we already had one person armed with a firearm. We know it's a large gang group. We know that gang members have firearms. We know that they're - - they're in - - we've had - - from my training and experience, we've had large groups, multiple gang members armed with firearms to protect themselves from enemy gangs, from shootings when they're out in the open. I didn't know if this guy was armed with a firearm, this individual that climbed the fence. I don't know what his intentions were to hurt myself or my partner. And due to the fact that he may be armed with a firearm, and the situation could arise to that point where deadly force would be necessary, I drew my firearm."*⁴²

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough evaluation of the reasonableness of Officers Lockwood's Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB noted that Edmond was armed with a handgun and was fleeing into a dark, unknown location. Edmond's actions presented a potential deadly threat to the community.

The UOFRB conducted a diligent and individual assessment of each officer's articulation regarding their decision to draw/exhibit their service pistols. The UOFRB considered that Officer Lockwood was an experienced gang enforcement officer and observed there were numerous unidentified gang members that were gathered within the large group of individuals at the park.

The UOFRB noted that Officer Lockwood had observed Edmond grasp a heavy object in his right front pants pocket and formed the opinion based on his training and experience, as well as Edmond's actions, that Edmond was armed with a handgun. Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol based on his belief that Edmond was armed with a handgun and due to the possibility that the tactical situation could lead to the use of deadly force. According to Officer Lockwood, as he engaged in foot pursuit of Edmond, he observed a narrow walkway which Edmond was about to run through which was a potentially disadvantages tactical position. In addition, Officer Lockwood did not know the layout of the multi-unit apartment complex and the lighting was poor throughout the location.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Lockwood while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a

⁴¹ Officer Castanon, Page 22-23, lines 23-25, 1-2, and 4-8.

⁴² Officer Castanon, Page 23, lines 11-24.

substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, the Chief found Officer Lockwood's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough evaluation of the reasonableness of Officer Castanon's Drawing/Exhibiting. The UOFRB noted that Officer Castanon had observed Edmond's hands were near his waist and appeared to be concealing an object. Based on his training and experience, coupled with Edmond's actions, Officer Castanon formed the opinion that Edmond was armed with a handgun.

The UOFRB noted that Officer Castanon did not draw his service pistol while in foot pursuit of Edmond and instead took on the role of communications officer as he was positioned to the rear. Immediately following the OIS, Officer Castanon proceeded to broadcast shots fired, officer needs help. Officer Castanon then handcuffed Edmond and took him into custody. Immediately after he completed handcuffing Edmond, Officer Castanon witnessed Collins climb over the north fence of the multi-unit apartment complex, which bordered the south portion of Vermont Square Park. Officer Castanon drew his service pistol based on his training and experience as well as his observations that there were gang members present within the large group of individuals at the park, and they are commonly known to be armed with weapons. Additionally, Officer Castanon did not know the intentions of Collins, and at the time Officers Castanon and Lockwood were isolated and by themselves in a dark area, waiting for additional resources. Officer Castanon drew his service pistol based on his belief that Collins may be armed and that the tactical situation may escalate to where deadly force was necessary.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Castanon, while faced with similar circumstances, would reasonably believe that there was a substantial risk that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified.

Therefore, the Chief found Officer Castanon's Drawing/Exhibiting to be In-Policy, No Further Action.

Use of Force – General⁴³

- *It is the policy of this Department that personnel may use only that force which is "objectively reasonable" to:*

⁴³ Special Order No. 4, 2020 – Policy on the Use of Force - Revised, was adopted by the Department on February 5, 2020, after this incident occurred.

- *Defend themselves;*
- *Defend others;*
- *Effect an arrest or detention;*
- *Prevent escape; or,*
- *Overcome resistance*

The Department examines reasonableness using Graham v. Connor and from the articulated facts from the perspective of a Los Angeles Police Officer with similar training and experience placed in generally the same set of circumstances. In determining the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. Those factors may include, but are not limited to:

- *The seriousness of the crime or suspected offense;*
- *The level of threat or resistance presented by the subject;*
- *Whether the subject was posing an immediate threat to officers or a danger to the community;*
- *The potential for injury to citizens, officers or subjects;*
- *The risk or apparent attempt by the subject to escape;*
- *The conduct of the subject being confronted (as reasonably perceived by the officer at the time);*
- *The amount of time and any changing circumstances during which the officer had to determine the type and amount of force that appeared to be reasonable;*
- *The availability of other resources;*
- *The training and experience of the officer;*
- *The proximity or access of weapons to the subject;*
- *Officer versus subject factors such as age, size, relative strength, skill level, injury/exhaustion and number officers versus subjects; and,*
- *The environmental factors and/or other exigent circumstances.*

(Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 1, Section 556.10)

Lethal Use of Force

- *Law enforcement officers are authorized to use deadly force to:*
 - *Protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
 - *Prevent a crime where the subject's actions place person(s) in imminent jeopardy of death or serious bodily injury; or,*
 - *Prevent the escape of a violent fleeing felon when there is probable cause to believe the escape will pose a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the officer or others if apprehension is delayed. In this circumstance, officers shall, to the extent practical, avoid using deadly force that might subject innocent bystanders or hostages to possible death or injury.*

(Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume No.1, Section 556.10).

- **Officer Lockwood** – 9mm, four rounds fired in a northwesterly direction. All rounds were fired from an approximate distance of five to seven feet in the time span of approximately 1.1 seconds.

According to Officer Lockwood, he briefly lost sight of Edmond as Edmond maneuvered around a corner of the apartment complex and into a rear courtyard area. As Officer Lockwood ran past the corner of the building Officer Lockwood regained sight of Edmond and observed Edmond turning back toward Officer Lockwood. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond had a pistol grip on a black handgun in his left hand. Based on Edmond's movement, Officer Lockwood believed that Edmond was turning to shoot at him. Officer Lockwood fired his service pistol three times, utilizing a one-handed grip, in order to defend himself from the deadly threat presented by Edmond. Based on the minimal amount of time Officer Lockwood had to react, he stated he was unable to use the sights of his service pistol to gain a sight picture and was point shooting. Officer Lockwood assessed as he fired in order to determine if his shots were hitting and effective. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond fall to the ground at which time Officer Lockwood stopped firing. Immediately after Edmond fell to the ground, Officer Lockwood observed the firearm hit the ground in close proximity to Edmond. Officer Lockwood continued to fire his service pistol until he no longer believed Edmond was an immediate threat.

Note: The FID investigation revealed Officer Lockwood fired four rounds from his service pistol.

Officer Lockwood recalled, "It was a very brief second that it appeared like he was out of sight. As I came into that little area, I observed him turning, waving his body to the right, basically turning back towards me. At that time, I believed I observed what was a black handgun in his left hand. I fired approximately what I believe to be three shots in his direction one handed with my left hand holding the flashlight, illuminating him. It was at that time I noticed he fell to the ground, and I heard the loud clank, and I observed a black handgun fall right behind him."⁴⁴

So as he's starting to run to the right around the, I guess you'd call that the rear of the apartment complex, it's as his body is starting to turn towards his right back in my direction is when I observe what I believe to be a black firearm in his left hand. To be perfectly honest, I believe it had just started to come around, and it was still pointed maybe in I would say a northern direction."⁴⁵

As I came around, he was starting to turn. I can't say exactly how far through the turn he was. At that point, though, I perceived that he was turning to shoot at me. And being afraid that he was going to shoot me is when I fired. And I can't recall if

⁴⁴ Officer Lockwood, Page 12, lines 4-14.

⁴⁵ Officer Lockwood, Page 23-24, lines 25, 1-5, and 7-9

his body stopped turning then due to being shot, or if it turned around further to the right.⁴⁶

So, based on the way of how quickly it unfolded and with how I was holding my firearm, I was not actually able to gain a sight picture of my sights. And more or less, I was doing a point shooting, attempting to point my firearm in the direction of the suspect and get a close proximity hit.⁴⁷

Yes. So, as I was firing, I was assessing whether my shots were hitting and were being effective. And as I was firing, I was assessing to see if he was dropping and the firearm was falling out of his hand, or if he was continuing to turn and try and engage me. And I perceived as I fired those three shots that they were effective. I observed him fall. I stopped firing. I then observed the firearm hit the ground.⁴⁸

As he fell, he actually was falling backwards towards his back. As he fell on his back, both hands shot out into an upward and outward motion to show me he had nothing in his hands, while simultaneously, the firearm fell directly behind him fairly close to his head, because I could observe his head was - - initially, I could see the firearm.⁴⁹

It was - - it was very dark in the back. I don't believe there was any lights other than ambient lighting from inside the apartment complex, as well as lighting from the park. I held my flashlight. It's possible it was just being held down in a momentary, so it could have been sporadic. But I believe I was holding it with intention of getting a constant light to gain visual of the suspect during the whole time I was firing.⁵⁰

Once I exited that little rear alcove area to the rear, and I perceived the threat with the suspect.⁵¹

I believed he had a firearm.⁵²

⁴⁶ Officer Lockwood, Page 25, lines 5-11.

⁴⁷ Officer Lockwood, Page 25, lines 17-22.

⁴⁸ Officer Lockwood, Page 26-27, lines 18-25 and 1.

⁴⁹ Officer Lockwood, Page 27, lines 4-10.

⁵⁰ Officer Lockwood, Page 28, lines 3-11.

⁵¹ Officer Lockwood, Page 32, lines 22-24.

⁵² Officer Lockwood, Page 3, line 3.

*So he had - - his left hand appeared to be in a - - how do you describe it? I guess you'd say a pistol grip or a firearm grip. And it appeared to be a black object in his left hand as he was turning towards me.*⁵³

*Because as I was firing and assessing, through the firing, I observed him to start to fall back and the gun fall and hit the ground. So at that point, I no longer believed he was an immediate threat.*⁵⁴

In this case, the UOFRB conducted a thorough review and analysis of the reasonableness of Officer Lockwood's use of lethal force. The UOFRB took into consideration that Edmond turned suddenly and without warning toward Officer Lockwood and was armed with a handgun.

The UOFRB considered that upon his arrival at scene, Officer Lockwood exited his police vehicle and attempted to gain information on the large group of individuals that had gathered at Vermont Square Park while additionally looking for persons of interest. As Officer Lockwood began walking east toward Budlong Avenue from the center of the park, he observed Edmond attempting to evade contact and quickly exit the park. Officer Lockwood followed Edmond to determine if Edmond was armed or possibly engaged in criminal activity. As Officer Lockwood reached the west sidewalk of Budlong Avenue, he illuminated Edmond with his flashlight and observed Edmond lose his footing. Officer Lockwood observed Edmond grasp a heavy object in his right front pants pocket and formed the opinion, based on his training and experience, coupled with Edmond's actions, that Edmond was armed with a handgun.

Officer Lockwood initiated a foot pursuit of Edmond west through a multi-unit apartment complex and provided clear commands to Edmond to show his hands and get on the ground. Edmond did not comply with the commands and Officer Lockwood drew his service pistol prior to pursuing Edmond through a narrow walkway. Edmond, suddenly and without warning, aggressively turned toward Officer Lockwood in a clockwise direction, holding a black handgun in the left hand, which lead to Officer Lockwood firing four rounds from his service pistol.

The UOFRB considered the rapid speed in which Edmond turned toward Officer Lockwood armed with a handgun. The UOFRB also considered the minimal amount of time in which Officer Lockwood had to make a decision, as well as the imminent deadly threat posed by Edmond to the officers. The UOFRB considered the presentation by FID investigators which included that Officer Lockwood was five to seven feet from Edmond when Edmond began to aggressively turn toward Officer Lockwood while armed with a handgun.

⁵³ Officer Lockwood, Page 33, lines 7-11.

⁵⁴ Officer Lockwood, Page 45, lines 21-25.

The UOFRB also noted that though Officer Lockwood, in response to the imminent deadly threat presented by Edmond's actions, fired four rounds from his service pistol in approximately 1.1 seconds, Officer Lockwood was continuously assessing Edmond's actions. Officer Lockwood ceased fire as he continually assessed and observed Edmond fall to the ground, no longer posing a deadly threat.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the UOFRB determined, and the Chief concurred, that an officer with similar training and experience as Officer Lockwood would reasonably believe Edmond's actions presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury and that the Use of Lethal Force would be objectively reasonable.

Therefore, the Chief found Officer Lockwood's Use of Lethal Force to be In Policy, No Further Action.

Additional/Equipment

- **Profanity** – The investigation revealed that Officer Lockwood utilized profanity while engaged in foot pursuit of Edmond. Captain A. Neal, Serial No. 30599, Commanding Officer, 77th Street Patrol Division, advised that this issue was addressed through the issuance of an Employee Comment Sheet and the generation of a Supervisory Action Item (SAI). The Commanding Officer of Operations – South Bureau (OSB) and the Director of the Office of Operations (OO) concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.
- **BWV Activation** – The investigation revealed Officers Coats did not activate her BWV throughout the entire duration of the incident. Therefore, no BWV video was captured.

The issue was brought to the attention of Captain Neal who advised this deviation from Department policy was addressed through the issuance of a Comment Card and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

Officer Castanon's BWV was activated late. Officer Castanon exited his police vehicle and walked into Vermont Square Park. He made contact with an unidentified male and female, however his conversation with them was not captured due to his late BWV activation.

The issue was brought to the attention of Captain Neal who advised this deviation from Department policy was addressed through the issuance of a Comment Card and the generation of a SAI. The Commanding Officer of OSB and the Director of OO concurred with this action. As such, the Chief deemed no further action is necessary.

The Office of Operations conducted a random inspection of BWV's associated to Officers Coats and Castanon from June 26, 2019, through July 25, 2019, and an inspection of BWV's from April 1, 2020, through April 30, 2020, for compliance with BWV and DICV policies. The results of the inspection indicated late activations and buffering concerns. These identified concerns will be handled through the initiation of a personnel complaint investigation.

Audio/Video Recordings

- **Digital In-Car Video System (DICVS)** – Officers Lockwood and Castanon's police vehicle was equipped with a DICVS. However, the officers parked their vehicle at scene prior to the OIS and the DICVS was not activated. Fifty-three of the responding units had their DICVS activated. Because all the units responded after the OIS occurred, none of their DICVS footage captured the OIS.
- **Body Worn Video (BWV)** – Officers Lockwood and Castanon activated their BWV prior to making contact with Edmond and recorded the entire incident including the OIS. One hundred fifty-one officers responded to the scene from various divisions and activated their BWV as required per Department policy. None of the additional responding officers' BWV captured footage of the OIS.

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INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW

Inspector General Analysis

Investigation Quality

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to investigation quality.

Training Issues

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to training.

Equipment Issues

- No significant issues of concern were identified in relation to equipment.

Detention

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's conclusion that the detention of the suspect was consistent with Department policy.

Tactical De-escalation

- The performance of Officers Lockwood and Castanon during this incident raises a number of concerns related to tactical de-escalation, beginning with their failure to develop a tactical plan for safely conducting a walk-through of Vermont Square Park. According to the officers, they observed between 80 and 200 people in the park. As they assessed the situation, they knew from experience that the park was frequented by current and former gang members, and that a gathering of this size was unusual. Without a tactical plan, a request for additional resources, an advisement to CD that they were Code-6, or any significant communication between them, Officers Lockwood and Castanon entered the park and began to walk through the crowd. The officers observed a couple of people walking away from the crowd, on the opposite side of the park, and made contact with them. It was only following this contact that Officer Lockwood advised CD that he and Officer Castanon were Code-6 at the park and requested two additional units to assist. These actions were inconsistent with the Planning, Other Resources, and Lines of Communication components of the Department's de-escalation training. Furthermore, as there was no exigency requiring the officers to enter the park without first taking time to develop a plan, communicate, and assemble appropriate resources, the officers did not take advantage of available time.

Just after advising CD of their location, the officers observed two males exiting the park in what appeared to the officers to be an attempt to evade contact with the police. As Officer Lockwood shined his flashlight on these two individuals, Edmond began to run. He slipped and fell, but as he regained his footing he appeared to

grab at a heavy object in his pants. Both officers observed this and made a quick assessment that Edmond was clutching at a weapon in his pants. Both officers initiated a foot pursuit of Edmond, and although Officer Lockwood characterized the pursuit as being carried out in containment mode, the officers' actions during this time were more consistent with a pursuit conducted in apprehension mode. Officer Castanon requested a "backup for a 415 man with a gun" without advising CD that he and Officer Lockwood were in foot pursuit, and without updating his and Officer Lockwood's location or direction of travel. Even though both officers stated that they believed Edmond to be armed, they rapidly closed the distance between him and themselves. As a result of these actions, the officers diminished any opportunity they might otherwise have had to redeploy or maintain a tactical advantage by other means in the event that Edmond presented a threat to them with his firearm. As such, the manner in which the foot pursuit was conducted was also inconsistent with de-escalation training.

BWV and DICVS Policy Compliance

SERIAL	NAME	TIMELY BWV ACTIVATION	FULL 2-MINUTE BUFFER	BWV RECORDING OF ENTIRE INCIDENT	TIMELY DICVS ACTIVATION	DICVS RECORDING OF ENTIRE INCIDENT
38804	Lockwood, Kurt	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A
41832	Castanon, Andrew	No	Yes	Yes	N/A	N/A

Additional

- The investigation of this incident revealed a relatively slow response by an RA to provide medical treatment to Edmond after the OIS. As noted in a supplemental report by FID:
 - The time between the OIS and the request for an RA by Officer Castanon was 1 minute and 17 seconds.
 - The time between the request for an RA and the arrival of the RA at the scene was 8 minutes and 31 seconds.
 - The time between the request for an RA and the arrival of the RA at Edmond's location to initiate medical treatment was 9 minutes and 50 seconds.
 - The time between the OIS and the arrival of the RA at Edmond's location to initiate medical treatment was 11 minutes and 7 seconds.⁵⁵

FID advised the OIG that it was unable to determine the cause of the delayed response by the RA, but that its investigation did not identify any actions by LAPD personnel that might have contributed to the delay.

⁵⁵ FID Supplemental Report, dated May 26, 2020.

Inspector General Recommendations

Tactics

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's findings.

Drawing/Exhibiting

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's findings.

Lethal Use of Force

- The OIG concurs with the Chief's findings.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. P. Smith". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letters of each word being capitalized and prominent.

Mark P. Smith
Inspector General